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Abstract: A new scenario for generating a secret key and two 
private keys among three Terminals in the presence of an 
external eavesdropper is considered. Terminals 1, 2 and 3 intend 
to share a common secret key concealed from the external 
eavesdropper (Terminal 4) and simultaneously, each of 
Terminals 1 and 2 intends to share a private key with Terminal 3 
while keeping it concealed from each other and from Terminal 4. 
All four Terminals observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources 
and there is a public channel from Terminal 3 to Terminals 1 and 
2. An inner bound of the "secret key-private keys capacity 
region" is derived and the single letter capacity regions are 
obtained for some special cases. 
Keywords-information-theoretic security, source model secret 
key sharing, secret key-private keys capacity region. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION1  
The broadcasting nature of wireless communication 
networks leads to easy eavesdropping. Due to this fact, secret 
key sharing between Terminals is of great importance to 
provide secure communication. An approach to achieve this 
goal is based on exploiting correlated sources as common 
randomness between Terminals and communicating over a 
public channel.  
Communication of confidential message was characterized 
by Wyner [1], in which the model of wiretap channel was 
introduced. Subsequently, Csiszar and Korner in [2] considered 
the problem of transmitting a confidential message with a 
common message in a non-degraded discrete memoryless 
broadcast channel. Sharing a secret key between two Terminals 
in the presence of an eavesdropper was first investigated by 
Maurer in [3] and Ahlswede and Csiszar in [4] where the 
source and the channel common randomness were used to 
share a secret key between the two Terminals. Csiszar and 
Narayan in [5] considered the mentioned problem in the 
presence of a forth node as a helper. Sharing a secret key 
between more than two Terminals has been explored by several 
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authors such as [6-14]. In some other scenarios, it is intended to 
share multiple secret keys among different groups of Terminals 
simultaneously. In  [11] Ye and Narayan examined the problem 
of sharing a secret-key and a private-key for three Terminals. 
They investigated the problem for generating a secret key 
among three Terminals and simultaneously a designated pair of 
Terminals generates a private key. They explored the problem 
at the presence of an eavesdropper who can just wiretap the 
communications over the public channel and has not any other 
resources to eavesdrop. In [13] Salimi et.al investigated 
generating two private-keys in a source model consisting of 
three users. Each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a private key 
with user 3 where user 1 acts as a wire tapper for user 2 and 
vice versa. In their scenario, two situations were investigated 
based on direction of public channel.   
In this paper, a new scenario is considered for sharing one 
secret key and two private keys, simultaneously. In our 
scheme, there are four Terminals that observe i.i.d. outputs of 
distinct correlated sources. Terminals 1, 2 and 3 wish to share a 
secret key among them which should be effectively concealed 
from the forth Terminal which acts as an external 
eavesdropper. Simultaneously, each of Terminals 1 and 2 
intends to share a private key with Terminal 3 while keeping it 
concealed from each other and from the external eavesdropper. 
There is a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity from 
Terminal 3 to the other Terminals. Compared to [11], our work 
requires different security requirements due to the fact that the 
external wire tapper is equipped with source observations 
rather than the public channel observations.  Also, sharing two 
private keys are intended in our work. Beside, compared to 
[12,13], our work necessitates another requirement as sharing a 
common secret key between the three Terminals and 
considering an external eavesdropper. We have derived an 
inner bound of the secret key-private keys capacity region in 
the described scenario.  It is not known if this bound is the 
capacity region in general, however, we have shown that the 
inner bound is the capacity region in some special cases which 
means that our bound is tight. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, 
the model and the problem preliminaries are illustrated. In 
Section III, our main results and the intuition behind them are 
given. In Section IV, the proofs are provided. Finally, in 
Section V, the concluding remarks are given. Throughout the 
paper, the upper case letters indicate random variables and the 
lower case letters indicate their realizations.  
II. PROBLEM SETUP 
Consider a discrete memoryless multiple sources (DMMS) 
consisting of four components with alphabets 1 2 3 4( , , , )χ χ χ χ
and corresponding generic random variables (r.v.s)
1 2 3 4, , ,X X X X . Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, observe 
n i.i.d. repetitions of the r.v.s 1 2 3 4, , ,X X X X . Furthermore, a 
noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity is available such 
that Terminal 3 can broadcast its required information over it. 
The information sent over the public channel is depicted by 3F
which is a stochastic function of Terminal 3’s observation or in 
other words 3 3( )NF f X= .  
The r.v.s 0 1 2, ,K K K are all functions of 3
NX taking values 
from the finite sets 0 1 2, ,Κ Κ Κ ,  respectively. 0K represents the  
common secret key among Terminals 1 and 2 and 3 and 
1 2,K K represent private keys for Terminals 1, 2 respectively. 
Terminal 3 generates a secret key and two private keys 
1 2( , , )SK PK PK  as a function of 3NX or in other words
*
1 2 3( , , ) ( )
NSK PK PK f X=  and then, Terminal 3 sends 3F  over the 
public channel. After receiving 3F , Terminals 1 and 2 compute 
the estimation of key pairs 0 1 0 2( , ),( , )K K K K , respectively, as 
deterministic functions of the information available at each 
Terminal, such that: 
0,1 1 1 1 3 0,2 2 2 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )N NK K g X F K K g X F= =  
Here 0,1 0,2ˆ ˆ( , )K K take value from the finite set 0Κ , and  1 2ˆ ˆ( , )K K
take value from the finite sets 1 2,Κ Κ , respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now we define conditions which should be addressed in 
our key sharing scheme. 
Definition 1: The secret key-private keys rate triple 
0 1 2( , , )R R R is an achievable rate triple, if for every 0ε > and
N sufficiently large, we have: 
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     Equations (1) and (2) are the reliability conditions of the 
keys at Terminals 2 and 3. Equation (3) means that the private 
keys of Terminals 2 and 3 are effectively hidden from each 
other. Equation (4) means that all the keys should be kept 
secret from Terminal 4. Finally the set of equations in (5-6) 
indicate the uniformity conditions. 
 
      Definition 2: The region containing all the achievable 
secret key-private keys rate triple 0 1 2( , , )R R R  is the secret key-
private keys capacity region. 
III. STATEMENT OF RESULTS 
In this section we state our main results. 
Theorem 1: (inner bound) The following region of non-
negative rate triples is achievable for the described source 
model:  
0 1 2 1 2 3 4( , , , , , , , )
I
P u u u x x x x q
R Conv= ∪
0 1 2
0 1 2
0 0 1 0 2 0 4
1 1 1 0
1 2 2 0 1 4 2 0
2 2 2 0
2 1 1 0 2 4 1 0
( , , ) :
0, 0, 0
[min{ ( ; | ), ( ; | )} ( ; | )]
[ ( ; | , )
max{ ( ; , | , ), ( ; , | , )}]
[ ( ; | , )
max{ ( ; , | , ), ( ; , | , )}]
R R R
R R R
R I U X Q I U X Q I U X Q
R I U X U Q
I U X U U Q I U X U U Q
R I U X U Q
I U X U U Q I U X U U Q
+
+
+
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪≥ ≥ ≥⎪⎪ ≤ −⎪⎪ ≤ −⎨ ⎬⎪⎪⎪ ≤ −⎪⎪⎩
(8)
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where 0 1 2, , ,Q U U U  are random variables taking values in 
sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution: 
0 1 2 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 0 3 1 0 3 2 0 3
1 2 3 4
( , , , , , , , ) ( | , , ) ( | ) ( | , ) ( | , )
( , , , )
p u u u x x x x q p q u u u p u x p u u x p u u x
p x x x x
=         
The function[ ]x + equals x  if 0x ≥ and 0 if 0x < , and Conv 
operator is a convex closure of the set. The sketch of the proof 
is given in Section IV.A. However, in continue, we briefly 
explain our coding scenario. 
    Remark 1: The above region can be achieved via separate 
decoding.  For achievability, we use a scheme which utilizes 
Fig1. Key agreement between Terminals 
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superposition coding as well as double layer binning. A similar 
method, called the secret superposition scheme, was used in 
[16] to send a confidential message in the channel model. Here, 
we use superposition coding to handle the secret key. In 
addition, double layer Binnig is used to meet the secrecy 
constrains in all layers which means that all the keys should be 
kept secret from the forth node. Our coding scheme is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remark 2: The dual problem of the described model in 
channel model is a broadcast channel with three receivers, in 
which different levels of secrecy must be satisfied and this 
problem is an open problem in general. 
We could not prove that the rate region in (8) is the 
capacity region in general; however, we have investigated 
some special cases where the rate region in (8) is the secret 
key-private keys capacity region. First, we derive an explicit 
outer bound for the secret key-private keys capacity region, and 
then we provide some special cases where the region in (8) 
coincides with the explicit outer bound. 
 
Proposition 1: In the key agreement scenario of the described 
model, if the rate triple 0 1 2( , , )R R R  is achievable, then it 
satisfy: 
0 3 1 4 3 2 4
1 3 1 4 3 1 2
2 3 2 4 3 2 1
min{ ( ; | ), ( ; | )}
min{ ( ; | ), ( ; | )} (9)
min{ ( ; | ), ( ; | )}
R I X X X I X X X
R I X X X I X X X
R I X X X I X X X
≤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪≤⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪≤⎩ ⎭
 
for any joint distribution 1 2 3 4( , , , )P X X X X . This bound can 
be automatically deduced from Theorem 1 of [4]. 
  
Corollary 1: When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 3 1 4 2X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region reduces to:  
0 2 1 3 1 40, 0,0 ( ; | )R R R I X X X= = ≤ ≤ . 
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by setting 
1 3 0 2,U X U U Q= = = = ∅ and noting that 
1 3 1 3 4 3 1 4( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; | )R I X X I X X I X X X= − = . The converse 
can be deduced from Proposition 1. It should be noted that 
when the source observations form a Markov chain as 
3 2 4 1X X X X− − − , the Secret key-private keys capacity 
region can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 1. 
     Corollary 2: When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 1 3 4 2X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region reduces to: 
0 2 1 3 1 40, 0,0 ( ; | )R R R I X X X= = ≤ ≤ . 
Achievability proof is the same as Corollary 1. The converse 
proof directly follows from the explicit upper bound of 
Proposition 1. When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 2 3 4 1X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 2. 
     Corollary 3: When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 3 1 2 4X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region reduces to: 
0 0 2 0 4
1 1 1 0 1 2 0 2
0 ( ; | ) ( ; | ),
0 ( ; | , ) ( ; | , ), 0
R I U X Q I U X Q
R I U X U Q I U X U Q R
≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤ − =  
where QUU ,, 01 are auxiliary random variables taking values in 
sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 
1 0 1 2 3 4 1 0 1 0 3 1 2 3 4( , , , , , , ) ( | , ) ( , | ) ( , , , )p u u q x x x x p q u u p u u x p x x x x=
that form Markov chains as 0 3 1 3,Q U X Q U X− − − − . 
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 and the Markov chain 
3 1 2 4X X X X− − − . The converse is proved in section IV.B. 
When the source observations form a Markov chain as 
3 2 1 4X X X X− − − , the Secret key-private keys capacity 
region can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 3. 
Corollary 4: When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 2 1 3 4X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region reduces to: 
0 0 2 0 4
1 1 1 0 1 4 0 2
0 ( ; | ) ( ; | ),
0 ( ; | , ) ( ; | , ), 0
R I U X Q I U X Q
R I U X U Q I U X U Q R
≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤ − =  
where 1 0, ,U U Q are auxiliary random variables taking values 
in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 
1 0 1 2 3 4 1 0 1 0 3 1 2 3 4( , , , , , , ) ( | , ) ( , | ) ( , , , )p u u q x x x x p q u u p u u x p x x x x=  
that form Markov chains as 0 3 1 3,Q U X Q U X− − − −  and 
1 4 0 0 2( , , ) ( , , )U X Q U Q U X− − . Existence of such variables 
can be deduced from the Markov chain 2 1 3 4X X X X− − − . 
Achievability directly follows from Theorem 1 by setting 
2U =∅ . The converse can be proved the same as Corollary 3. 
When the source observations form a Markov chain as 
1 2 3 4X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys capacity 
region can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 4. 
Corollary 5: When the source observations form a Markov 
chain as 2 3 1 4X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys 
capacity region is achievable if : 
Fig. 2. Coding scheme 
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where 2 1 0, , ,U U U Q are auxiliary random variables taking values 
in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 
2 1 0 1 2 3 4 2 1 0 2 1 0 3 1 2 3 4( , , , , , , , ) ( | , , ) ( , , | ) ( , , , )p u u u q x x x x p q u u u p u u u x p x x x x=  
that form Markov chains as 
0 3 1 3 2 3 2 0 3 1, , , ( , )Q U X Q U X Q U X U U X U− − − − − − − −  . The 
proof is similar to the converse proof of corollary 3. This 
bound coincides with the inner bound if we have : 
0 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 4( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )U X Q X Q U U Q X U Q X U U U U Q X U U Q X− − − − − − −
 
This situation is illustrated in Fig.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
  
When the source observations form a Markov chain as 
1 3 2 4X X X X− − − , the secret key-private keys capacity region 
can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 5. 
     For two remaining Markov chains 3 4 1 2X X X X− − −  and 
3 4 2 1X X X X− − − all the rates will be equal to zero. It can be 
shown by the explicit upper bound in (9). 
IV. PROOFS 
A.  proof of Theorem 1(achieavblity) 
Due to space limitation, we avoid the details of the proof 
and the proof scheme is given in this section. For more details, 
it can be referred to the extended version of this paper in [17]. 
In order to construct the codebook, Terminal 3 generates its 
random codebook as follow. For an arbitrary distribution 0( )p u
generates collection of codewords each uniformly drawn from 
the set 
0 31
( )
|( )
N
U XT pε . Terminal 3 partitions these codewords 
into 0 0 0( )2N R R R′ ′′+ + bins with the same size in a uniformly manner 
, where 0 0 0 4 1( | , ) 2R R H U X Q ε′+ = + and 0 0 4 1( ; | )R I U X Q ε′′ = − . 
The bin index of each bin is denoted by the triple 0 0 0( , , )k k k′ ′′
and the corresponding random variables are 0 0 0, ,K K K′ ′′ , 
respectively. Next, for every codeword 
0 0 00,{ , , }
N
k k ku ′ ′′ , Terminal 3 
generates 1 1 1( )2N R R R′ ′′+ + codewords 1 1 1 1( , , )Nu k k k′ ′′
1 1 1
1 1 1{1,...,2 }, {1,...,2 }, {1,...,2 }
NR NR NRk k k′ ′′′ ′′∈ ∈ ∈ , where
1 1 1 2 2 0 1 4 2 0 1min{ ( | , , , ), ( | , , , )} 2R R H U X U U Q H U X U U Q ε′+ = +
and 1 1 2 2 0 1 4 2 0 1max{ ( ; , | , ), ( ; , | , )}R I U X U U Q I U X U U Q ε′′= −  , 
according to 
1 0 3| , 1, 0, 0 0 0 3,
1
( | ( , , ), )
N
U U X i i i
i
p u u k k k x
=
′ ′′∏ and the 
corresponding random variables of bin indices are 1 1 1, ,K K K′ ′′ . 
Similarly Terminal 3 generates 2 2 2( )2N R R R′ ′′+ +  codewords
2 2 2 2( , , )
Nu k k k′ ′′  , 2 2 22 2 2{1,...,2 }, {1,...,2 }, {1,...,2 },NR NR NRk k k′ ′′′ ′′∈ ∈ ∈  
  where 
2 2 2 1 1 0 2 4 1 0 1min{ ( | , , , ), ( | , , , )} 2R R H U X U U Q H U X U U Q ε′+ = +
and 2 2 1 1 0 2 4 1 0 1max{ ( ; , | , ), ( ; , | , )} ,R I U X U U Q I U X U U Q ε′′ = −
according to 
2 0 3| , 2, 0, 0 0 0 3,
1
( | ( , , ), )
N
U U X i i i
i
p u u k k k x
=
′ ′′∏  and the 
corresponding random variables of bin indices are 2 2 2, ,K K K′ ′′ . 
Now, for a fixed distribution 0 1 2( | , , )P q u u u Terminal 3 
generates 0 1 2( ( ; ))2N I U U U Q i.i.d. code words of length N with the 
distribution ( )p q . All Terminals are informed of binning 
scheme and distributions. For every ε-typical sequence 
3 3
N NX x= , the set of codewords 0Nu which are jointly typical 
with 3Nx is denoted by 
3
0( ) N
N
x
U and for a fixed jointly typical 
sequences 0 3( , )N Nu x , the set of codewords 1Nu  which are jointly 
typical with 0 3( , )N Nu x is denoted by 
0 3
1 ,
( ) N NN u xU . Similarly we 
can establish the set of codewords 
0 3
2 ,
( ) N NN u xU . 
For encoding, Terminal 3 observes the i.i.d. sequence of 
3 3
N NX x= from its memoryless source and selects the 
corresponding sub-codebook. If the observed sequence was not 
ε-typical, it would declare an error and tries for the next 
observation. Afterward, Terminal 3 randomly selects the 
sequence 0Nu from the set 
3
0( ) N
N
x
U and then randomly selects 
sequences 1 2( , )N Nu u from the set 
0 3 0 3
1 2, ,
( ) ,( )N N N NN Nu x u xU U , 
respectively. Then He chooses respective row indices, 0 1 2, ,k k k
of the selected codewords 0 1 2( , , )N N Nu u u as a secret key, private 
key 1 and private key 2  respectively, and he sends the column 
indices 0 1 2, ,k k k′ ′ ′ of the codewords over the public channel. In 
addition Terminal 3 sends index i of ( )NQ i which is jointly 
typical with the selected sequences 0 1 2( , , )N N Nu u u .  
For decoding, Terminals 1 and 2 should be able to 
reconstruct random variables pairs 0 1( , )U U  and 0 2( , )U U
respectively. For the purpose of reliable decoding of sequence 
0
nu by Terminals 1 and 2, Terminal 3 should at least send 
information with the rate 0 0 1 0 2max{ ( | , ), ( | , )},R H U X Q H U X Q′ =  
therefore the maximum achievable secret key rate is obtained 
as: 
0 0 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 4( ) ( ; , ) min{ ( ; | ), ( ; | )} ( ; | ),H U I U X Q R I U X Q I U X Q I U X Q′− − = −   
Fig.3. An example for case 2 3 1 4X X X X− − −  
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where the term 0 4 0( ; , )I U X Q R ′+  is the leakage information 
rate. With access to 0U , our equivocation from 1U  reduces to 
1 0( | )H U U . From slepian-wolf coding [15], we deduce that 
Terminal 3 should send information at least with the rate
1 1 1 0( | , , )R H U X U Q′ = , so that Terminal 1 can correctly 
reconstruct 1U . Hence: 
1 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 4 2 0 1( | ) [ ( ; | ) max{ ( ; , | , ), ( ; , | , )} ].R H U U I U Q U I U X U U Q I U X U U Q R′= − + +  
The same approach can be followed for 2R . In continue, we 
will prove security conditions (3). Security condition (4) can be 
deduced using the same approaches. We have: 
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 Inequality (a) follows from the fact that 
1 1 2 0 2 1( | , , , , , ) 0
N N N N NH K U X U U Q K ′ =  because 1K  is one of the 
indices of 1NU , (b) from the same approach as lemma 1 in [14] 
to show 1 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 2( | , , , ) ( | , , , )N N N N NNH U X U U Q H U X U U Q Nε≤ + and 
(c) from the same approach as lemma 2 in [14] to show 
1 2 0 2 1 1 3( | , , , , , )
N N N N NH U X U U Q K K Nε′ ≤ . By choosing 1 2 3, ,ε ε ε such 
that 1 2 3ε ε ε ε+ + ≤ , the security condition (3) is proved. Using 
the same approaches, we can deduce 2 1 0 1 2( ; , , , , )NI K X K K K I ε′ ′ ′ ≤
and hence, the security condition (3) is satisfied. Analysis of 
security condition in (4) is given in [17]. 
B. Converse proof 
In this subsection, the converse part of corollary 3 is proved 
in which the source observations form the Markov chain
3 1 2 4X X X X− − − .  
First, we bound the secret key rate 0R . Fano’s inequality at 
Terminal 2 results in: 
( )
0 2 3 0( | , ) 1
n n
e nH K X F nR P nε≤ + =  
Also the security condition at the forth Terminal should be 
satisfied as 0 1 2 4 3( , , ; , )
nI K K K X F nε≤ . We have: 
( )
0 0 4 3
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where in the above equations, (a) results from the security 
condition, (b) from Fano’s inequality, (c) from Lemma 1 of [2], 
(d) from the fact that 1 1 10 4 1 3 4 4,( ; | , , , ) 0
i i i
iI K X F X X X
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which can be deduced from the Markov chain 
3 1 2 4X X X X− − − , and memoryless property, it is shown in 
lemma 1 in [17], (e) from the definition of the random 
variables 0,,i iQ U as: 
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(f) from the fact that 0, 4, 2,( ; | , ) 0i i i iI U X Q X = which can be 
deduced from the Markov chain 3 1 2 4X X X X− − −   and (g) 
from considering V as a time sharing random variable 
independent of all the other random variables which uniformly 
takes value from the set {1, 2,..., }n and by setting nε ε ε′ + . 
Now, we will bound 1R . According to Fano’s inequality 
for Terminal 1’s private key, we have: 
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Also, the security condition for the mentioned private key 
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where in the above equations, (a) results from the security 
condition, (b) from Fano's inequality, (c) from lemma 1 in [2], 
(d) from the fact that 
1 1 1 1
1 4 4 3 0 1 2 2,( ; , | , , , , ) 0
i i i i
iI K X X F K X X X
− + − + =   which can be 
deduced from the Markov chain 3 1 2 4X X X X− − − , and 
memoryless property, it is shown in [17], (e) from the 
definition of the random variables 11, 1 1( , , )
i
i iU K X Q
−=  and 
0,,i iQ U as before, and (f) from considering V as a time sharing 
random variable independent of all the other random variables 
which uniformly takes value from the set {1, 2,..., }n and by 
setting 2 nε ε ε′′ + . 
For rate 2R , it is clear from the Markov chain that every 
message Terminal 2 decodes can also be decode by Terminal 1. 
Therefore in this case the private key 2 rate is equal to zero. 
But still we can prove this claim by noting that in the explicit 
outer bound we have 3 2 1( ; | ) 0I X X X = due to the Markov 
chain 3 1 2 4X X X X− − − .  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have studied the problem of simultaneous 
sharing a secret key and two private keys among three 
Terminals with an additional wire tapper. We have obtained an 
inner bound to the secret key-private keys capacity region. 
Also for some special cases, we have shown that the inner 
bound is the secret key-private keys capacity region 
demonstrating that the inner bound is tight. The investigated 
special cases include all the different Markov chains that the 
sources from. 
As a generalization of this work, for the case in which 
Terminal 3 is not a trusted party, one can study the case of 
having three private keys in this model. For now, we are 
working on a case in which the direction of the public channel 
is reversed; meaning the case in which only Terminals 1 and 2 
are allowed to talk over the public channel. 
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